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Abstract:  Volatile events in the stock market such as the 2010 Flash Crash have sparked 
concern that financial markets are “rigged” in favor of trading firms that use high 
frequency trading (“HFT”) systems. We analyze a regulatory change implemented by the 
SEC in 2007 by examining its effect on a key market metric, the bid-ask spread, an 
investor cost, and find that the regulatory shift, indeed, disadvantages investors. We link 
the implementation of this change to a shift in the volume of trades from a low-cost 
venue to a high-cost venue. We argue that this outcome is predicted by the incentives of 
the venues, non-profit stock exchanges owned by different types of members. The less-
volatile, lower-cost New York Stock Exchange was owned by underwriters and included 
a specialist system that is less vulnerable to HFT tactics that can disadvantage investors. 
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I. Introduction 
 
On May 6, 2010, a dramatic price drop, now known widely as the “Flash Crash,” 
shocked major stock indices in the United States. Within five minutes nearly 1000 points 
had been wiped off the Dow Jones Index - approximately $1 trillion or 9% of its value. 
Yet, within the following fifteen minutes, the Index regained the bulk of those losses. 
Such an extreme volatility event should be exceptionally rare, if not impossible, and yet it 
happened. Smaller versions of the Flash Crash now occur on a regular basis in the capital 
markets typically hitting individual stocks. One study discovered more than 5,000 such 
“mini flash crashes” during a four-month period (Golub et al. 2012). Coincident with the 
appearance of incidents of extreme market volatility is the new dominance of so-called 
high frequency trading (“HFT”) systems. Firms deploying these computerized order 
systems are now responsible for more than 60% of the trading volume in U.S. listed 
stocks. HFTs engage in a range of complex trading tactics that take advantage of the new 
equally complex structure of the capital markets. There is some evidence that the 
mechanisms used by HFTs contribute to flash crashes. This has led some to charge that 
the stock markets are now “rigged.” (Lewis 2014) We trace the emergence of extreme 
volatility and concerns about HFTs to an important regulatory change implemented by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 2007. We measure the impact of 
this change empirically by examining its effect on a key market metric, the bid-ask 
spread, and find that the regulatory shift, indeed, disadvantages investors. 
Until relatively recently, U.S. stock exchanges shared much in common with 
other regulated utilities. Exchanges were private firms that served an important public 
function but could have monopolistic tendencies. Indeed, from its founding in the late 
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18th century until approximately 2007, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) enjoyed 
near-monopoly status, listing a set of stocks and executing the vast majority of trades for 
those stocks. The Nasdaq, once it emerged in the 1970s, also achieved a near monopoly 
for a separate set of stocks that it listed. 
Now, however, less than one-fifth of the trades of NYSE-listed stocks take place 
on the NYSE. The bulk of trading is now spread across as many as a dozen different 
trading venues, including so-called “dark pools” which do not share pricing data with 
other venues. This complex trading architecture enables HFTs to jump ahead of other 
investor orders or to create a false impression about the level of demand for certain stocks 
that can lead to trading profits for the HFT firms. 
However, these stock exchanges differed from typical regulated utilities in two 
ways that have important implications for regulation beyond this narrow context. 
Specifically, both were member-owned nonprofit organizations and both contained self-
regulatory functions. Nonprofit ownership raises analytical challenges in characterizing 
the incentives of an organization (Hansmann, 1980) and self-regulation complicates the 
effect of public regulation, which could either be a complement or a substitute for private 
ordering (DeMarzo et al., 2005). More broadly, while nonprofits might seem rare targets 
of regulation, they appear surprisingly often in such diverse settings as energy markets, 
health care, education, professional associations, industry trade groups and more. 
How does nonprofit ownership affect self-regulation and public regulation? The 
stock market and a 2007 regulatory change, Regulation NMS (Reg. NMS), provide an 
opportunity to show how nonprofit incentives can be analyzed and understood in a 
regulatory context. Previous studies have explored the nonprofit organization of stock 
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exchanges2 but focused on their stock-trading function, such that the NYSE and Nasdaq 
were assumed to have identical objectives. However, an important finding of the 
nonprofit literature is that nonprofits can have heterogeneous objective functions even 
within the same industry or market (Hansmann, 1980; Gertler and Kuan, 2008). Existing 
models also overlook the fact that exchanges are two-sided markets (Parker and Van 
Alstyne, 2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003), serving not just investors but also firms that list 
their shares. Combining these two observations, we posit an NYSE owned by 
underwriters who service listed firms (and therefore investors, as well), and a Nasdaq 
owned by broker-dealers who service only investors.3 
The incentives of two such exchanges differ substantially from each other. The 
agency problem between a broker-dealer and investors in a broker-dealer-owned 
exchange is modeled in the literature (DeMarzo et al., 2005). By contrast, an underwriter-
owned exchange involves the vertical integration of an input (Kuan, 2001). That is, 
underwriters operate a marketplace to increase the value of their underwriting services. 
(Below, we describe in some detail how orderliness in trading can attract investors, i.e., 
customers for underwriters’ clients). The resulting incentive difference thus leads to a 
predictable performance difference between the two exchanges. A broker-dealer-owned 
																																																								
2 Pirrong (2000) and Hart and Moore (1996) examine the reasons for nonprofit organization; and a 
literature on demutualization explores the role of technology in exchanges demutualization (Aggarwal, 
2002; Steil, 2002; Stoll, 2002) 
3 Institutional details are informative. Prior to its 2006 IPO, underwriters dominated the NYSE (Gasparino, 
2007; Harris, 2010; NYSE, 2006) and listed only those firms that met stringent, formal listing 
requirements. Long before the federal regulation of disclosures to investors, the NYSE mandated 
disclosures by their listed firms, following the “due diligence” practices developed by underwriting banks 
(Loss and Seligman 2001; Carrosso 1970). By contrast, the Nasdaq - an acronym for the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system - is a computer network that knits together a 
loose confederation of broker-dealers. The Nasdaq evolved out of the older over-the-counter market, which 
traded unlisted securities. Once established as a venue for listing, its culture of trading weaker firms 
continued, with minimal listing standards. 
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exchange would maximize profits from investors’ trades, while a vertically integrated 
exchange would offer trading services at a lower cost, possibly even below cost in a two-
sided market (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). In short, the Nasdaq would provide higher-cost 
services than the NYSE. 
Reg. NMS allows for a test of this hypothesis. Before 2007, a “best price rule” 
required brokers to route trades to the venue with the best posted price. For NYSE-listed 
stocks, this was typically the NYSE, so 80% or more of NYSE-listed stock trades took 
place on the NYSE, with the other 20% performed by smaller, regional exchanges and 
the Nasdaq.4 Reg. NMS replaced this rule and allowed brokers to route orders to the 
Nasdaq despite a better price on the manual trading floor of the NYSE.5 Only orders 
placed on automated exchanges would now be protected against “trade throughs.” 
This regulatory change accommodates a difference-in-differences analysis. In the 
pre-change period, any Nasdaq trading of NYSE-listed stocks had to be at the NYSE 
price or better. Thus, prices were constrained by regulation to be equal, while post-
change prices are de-constrained. We predict higher investor costs for the de-constrained, 
post-Reg. NMS Nasdaq trades in NYSE-listed stocks. Using stock trade data from a 
sample of over 200 NYSE-listed stocks 30 days before and after Reg. NMS, we show 
that spreads, a commonly used measure of investor cost, increase for trades on the 
Nasdaq relative to the NYSE.6 
																																																								
4 The best price rule explains, in large part, why the NYSE so long dominated trading of NYSE stocks. 
Nasdaq had a monopoly in trading Nasdaq stocks because the NYSE did no trading of Nasdaq stocks.  
5 Specifically, the trade-through provisions of Reg. NMS require brokers to route orders to the automated 
venue posting the best price. The floor of the NYSE is not automated as are the Nasdaq and the newest 
entrants, electronic communications networks (ECNs). The rule change was intended to give investors a 
choice, allowing them to choose the faster trade execution enabled by automation even though it might 
come at the expense of a better price. 
6 An important question is why investors would choose a high-cost venue over a low-cost venue. While 
some of the shift in volume was perhaps due to investors choosing faster execution over better prices, 
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The literature offers several alternate hypotheses about the impact of Reg. NMS. 
First, regulators predicted that competition would lead to lower costs for investors (SEC, 
2005b). Second, “cream-skimming” could occur in which an entrant, the Nasdaq, siphons 
off high-profit, uninformed, trades leaving lower-profit trades with the incumbent NYSE. 
This would raise investor costs at the NYSE (Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997; Easley 
et al. 1996; Battalio et al 1997).7 Third, auction (dealer) markets might be better than 
dealer (auction) markets, in general (Huang and Stoll 1996; Affleck-Graves et al. 1994; 
SEC 2004). Our test does not quite address this last hypothesis because the design details 
of any auction or dealer market influence performance so significantly that we cannot 
claim to compare these two mechanisms in the abstract. Rather, we argue that owners 
make design choices based on their incentives and our analysis compares two realized 
sets of design decisions. 
The dramatic changes in stock market structure since our period of analysis might 
suggest that this analysis is of historical interest only. Exchanges have proliferated, 
technology has made floor trading seem more archaic than in 2007, and neither the 
NYSE nor the Nasdaq is, any longer, a nonprofit. However, while a complete analysis of 
the current industry structure is beyond the scope of this paper, we would argue that our 
analysis actually helps explain today’s often bewildering stock market by reinterpreting 
the institutional design and self-regulation of the NYSE as part of a vertically integrated 
																																																								
earlier “cream-skimming” studies predict that volume would shift to electronic trading venues that pay 
brokers to route uninformed trades to their higher-cost venues, i.e., “payment for order flow.” An “arms 
race” among high frequency traders (HFTs) emerged to profit from this “cream,” contributing additional 
trading volume to the automated venues (Budish et. al, 2015). 
7 SEC Rule 19c-3 allowed dealers to pay to shift profitable “uninformed” trades to non-NYSE venues but 
only applied to certain NYSE stocks. This restriction makes a difference in differences comparison 
possible. Battalio et al. (1997) find that after the profitable, small-sized, uninformed trades moved to 
alternative venues, spreads increased for the NYSE stocks that were included in the Rule, but the analysis 
did not decompose the trades by venue to identify which trades had caused the increase. 
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system where private incentives generated a low-cost, orderly market that attracted 
investors and listings. More broadly, our study suggests that the incentives of nonprofits 
should be carefully considered because they may differ from those of for-profits and even 
other nonprofits in the same market, and that these incentives, which are susceptible to 
analysis, can affect self-regulation and the effectiveness of public regulation. 
II. Background 
The NYSE formed over 200 years ago when traders began gathering informally 
near what is today Wall Street in New York City. Michie (1987) and Geisst (1997) detail 
the long historical process of institutional change at the Exchange, which included 
moving trading activity indoors, formal incorporation, competition with a variety of 
formal and informal exchanges, and the adoption and adaptation of mechanisms, rules, 
and procedures, including restrictive membership and listing requirements. Thus, trading 
on the Exchange was limited to the carefully vetted owners of 1,366 “seats,” a number 
that was set in the mid-20th century and remained the same until the Exchange’s 
demutualization in 2006. Its listing standards meant that only a limited subset of publicly 
traded firms could sell their shares on the Exchange. 
Emerging from a longstanding but informal over the counter (“OTC”) trading 
market, the Nasdaq began formal operation in 1971 with the expectation that it could 
compete with the NYSE if the barriers between OTC and exchange-listed securities were 
removed. The Nasdaq comprises broker-dealers connected initially by telephone and later 
by a computer network. It was immediately more inclusive than the clubby NYSE. Thus, 
even unprofitable firms could trade on this market, and dealers needed only be members 
of the NASD to participate in that trading. By the mid-1990s the NASD had 5,400 firms 
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with more than 57,000 branch offices and “nearly 500,000 registered securities 
professionals.” (NASD Report cited in Loss and Seligman 2006 at 703) With more than 
5,500 listed companies, Nasdaq dealers in the mid-1990s traded in the stocks of more 
than twice as many firms as the NYSE. The Nasdaq’s listing standards were far laxer 
than those at the NYSE, which reflected the entity’s origins in the weakly regulated OTC 
market. One study, for example, found the NASDAQ’s standards to be “partially 
responsible for the influx of poorly-performing IPOs during the Nasdaq market bubble of 
the late 1990s.” (Klein and Mohanram 2008)  
While the original goal of the Nasdaq to engage as a direct competitor in trading 
of NYSE listed securities was long delayed, the Nasdaq served as a useful complement to 
the NYSE. The two exchanges differed in several ways in addition to the significantly 
larger number of listings on the Nasdaq. Quality seemed to be lower at the Nasdaq, where 
the total market capitalization was less than that of the NYSE despite the much greater 
number of listed firms. Different trading mechanisms were chosen by each exchange. 
Using the computer network that is the foundation of the Nasdaq, dealers take part in 
both sides of every trade, buying from sellers and selling to buyers. The NYSE employs a 
manual floor trading process that appears to be the outdated holdover of a centuries-old 
institution. However, our proposition that trading is an input to underwriting calls for a 
closer examination of this key institutional difference from the Nasdaq. 
For each listed firm, the NYSE assigns a specialist who conducts trades at a single 
trading post where trades in that firm’s shares are executed. The specialist (called a 
“designated market maker” in the post-Reg. NMS environment) is subject to rules that 
ensure an orderly price discovery process. Under the NYSE’s continuous “double-sided” 
 9 
auction mechanism, the specialist continuously gathers all buy and sell orders and sets a 
quote for bids and asks. This quote, by rule, must be close to the previous bids and asks 
(NYSE, Rule 104). Buyers are then matched to sellers by the specialist acting as a broker 
(or agent). Any unmatched residual is bought (sold) by the specialist acting as a dealer (or 
principal) if necessary to maintain a “fair and orderly” market (Exchange Act Sec. 11(b) 
and Rule 11b-1; NYSE Rule 104). Note that this differs from the Nasdaq’s pure dealer 
mechanism, in which the dealer is the counter-party on both sides of every transaction. 
The Nasdaq dealer buys from third party sellers, resells to third party buyers, and thus 
profits from a wider spread while not being required to enter the market to ensure 
orderliness. 
While the privileged information that a specialist enjoys is potentially valuable, 
rules and enforcement minimize its exploitation (Mann and Seijas 1991 and Dutta and 
Madhavan 1995; Battalio et al. 2007; Madhavan and Panchapagesan 2000, 655; but see 
SEC 2005a). If trading is viewed as an input to underwriting, specialists are best 
understood as having been, prior to the implementation of Reg. NMS, agents of the 
underwriter-owners of the NYSE and rule enforcement can be modeled as the outcome of 
a (metaphorical) principal-agent relationship. This is notably different from self-
regulation by Nasdaq members who are peers (SEC, 1996). 
An empirical literature has tried to measure the effects of different exchange 
features. Bid-ask spreads, for example, a measure of investor cost and disorderliness, are 
higher for Nasdaq stocks, but these could be the result of the underlying risk of the stocks 
or because of the Nasdaq’s dealer mechanism. Because each exchange long monopolized 
trading of (an almost) disjoint sets of stocks, however, direct comparisons of trading 
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mechanisms have been impossible.8 Reg. NMS allows for a better test, as NYSE stocks 
now trade freely at different prices on both exchanges. 
In replacing the old “best price” rule with what is now known as the “trade 
through” rule, Reg. NMS initiated substantial structural changes to the stock market. But 
even before Reg. NMS was implemented, change had already begun. The final regulation 
was adopted in August 2005; six months later, the NYSE demutualized via a merger with 
the publicly traded Archipelago, an ECN (Diamond and Kuan 2006). NYSE members, 
thereby, agreed to convert their nonprofit into a publicly traded, investor-owned for-profit 
corporation. While Reg. NMS and demutualization might seem to be two unrelated 
events, our model of vertical integration suggests otherwise. If underwriters who were 
vertically integrated with trading could no longer produce orderliness, they would sell 
their trading operation. The loss of control over orderliness was predictable; the NYSE’s 
share of trading volume in NYSE listed stocks began a steep decline to 25% (see Figure 
1) so that prices of those stocks were no longer set solely by the NYSE. 
Final implementation of Reg. NMS took an additional year and a half after NYSE 
demutualization, so that at the time of our empirical study, the NYSE and Nasdaq were 
both for-profit firms.9 We nevertheless interpret our results as reflecting the incentives of 
two different ownership interests, each of which instituted long-lasting mechanisms and 
structures that take time to dismantle. So, while a merger might reduce the NYSE’s self-
																																																								
8 Empirical strategies for comparing mechanisms include using matched pairs of stocks from the NYSE and 
Nasdaq. This is challenging because NYSE-listed firms have much bigger market capitalizations, which is 
a match dimension (Huang and Stoll 1996; Affleck-Graves et al. 1994). An alternative uses the relatively 
few firms that move their listings from the Nasdaq to the NYSE as the basis of comparison (Christie and 
Huang 1994; Barclay et al. 1998; SEC 2004). The studies find lower bid-ask spreads at the NYSE but are 
problematic because of selection issues. 
9 The NASD began the process of divesting and demutualizing the Nasdaq in 2000, well before Reg. NMS, 
and finally completed that process at the end of 2006. 
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regulatory activity, the dealer and auction mechanisms, which are of particular relevance 
for our study, would remain. Moreover, if the NYSE’s low-cost mechanism degraded 
towards a higher-cost mechanism, it would only work against our hypothesis and weaken 
our results. 
III. Hypotheses 
The interpretation of the bid-ask spread as an investor cost is well established in 
the literature, but is particularly appropriate in our case because heterogeneous ownership 
generates a hypothesis about differential spreads. Dealers profit directly from spreads, 
buying low and selling high from their customers, while underwriters have the opposite 
incentive, to reduce spreads to attract investors for their underwriting clients. Thus, we 
hypothesize that before Reg. NMS, spreads for NYSE-listed stocks are the same on both 
exchanges by rule, but increase for trades on the Nasdaq after Reg. NMS. Competing 
hypotheses are presented in the literature, as mentioned above. 
We estimate a fixed effects difference-in-differences model using panel data: 
 
sijt = a + b1nasdaqijt + b2afterijt + b3trendijt + b4nasdaqijt*afterijt + b5trendijt*afterijt + eit   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, sijt, is the bid-ask spread for stock i on exchange j at time t. 
Nasdaq is 1 for Nasdaq spreads and the omitted category is NYSE. After is 1 if time t is 
after Reg. NMS implementation. The explanatory variable is the interaction between 
nasdaq and after. We hypothesize that this interaction will be positive, as spreads on 
Nasdaq trades increase relative to NYSE trades. 
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As a robustness check, we include a time trend variable, trend, the time period in 
days. The interaction term trend*after, interacts the time trend with “after Reg. NMS” to 
detect whether our results are driven by a general time trend or only begin after the 
regulation. 
IV. Data 
We follow the literature on several dimensions of our empirical strategy. In 
addition to measuring daily bid-ask spreads (Corwin and Schultz, 2012) in a differences-
in-differences design, we also use a broad cross section of stocks, decompose the spread 
by venue (Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997), and use a 30-day event window. Also, we 
use transaction data from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) Trade and Quote 
(TAQ) dataset, which provides the timing and size of each trade, the price for each 
transaction, and the exchange where the trade took place. 
A. Sample 
We restrict our attention to NYSE-listed stocks because Reg. NMS affects the 
NYSE’s monopoly position in trading, not the Nasdaq. Recall that the Nasdaq’s 
monopoly in trading is the result of the NYSE’s organizational design, which provides no 
mechanism for trading Nasdaq-listed stocks. We selected a sample of 222 stocks from a 
variety of industries in the top quartile of trading volume and market capitalization. 
Together, they account for about 15% of the industrial firms listed on the NYSE. 
We selected actively traded stocks because of the endogeneity of trading volume 
and spreads: on the one hand, liquidity is associated with smaller spreads; on the other 
hand, lower spreads might encourage people to trade, thus increasing liquidity. So, if 
Reg. NMS caused spreads to decrease, as some of the alternate hypotheses predict, we 
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might worry that the measured decline in spreads was conflating the effect of Reg. NMS 
with increased liquidity as lower spreads attracted more investors. By restricting our 
attention to stocks that always trade heavily, we minimize the effect of liquidity changes 
on spread, and thus also do not control for volume in the regressions. Selecting only 
heavily traded stocks addresses a second liquidity problem, as well. If the share of trading 
shifted significantly away from the NYSE to the Nasdaq, the decrease in liquidity causes 
an identification problem. However, because “liquidity can obtain in fragmented trading, 
at least for the most active securities” (O'Hara 2004, 43), we use only heavily traded 
stocks to avoid falling below a liquidity threshold. 
B. Spread decomposition 
For each stock in our sample, we calculate the spread twice for each day: once 
using Nasdaq transactions and once using NYSE transactions. Recall that although we 
have described the NYSE as having a near-monopoly, 20% of trades of NYSE-listed 
stocks had traded on the Nasdaq long before Reg. NMS. So, for each stock on each day, 
we can separate Nasdaq transactions from NYSE transactions and calculate a separate 
spread for each exchange’s transactions. In this way, we can compare the spread 
generated by trading activity on the Nasdaq with the spread generated by trading activity 
on the NYSE for the same stock on the same day. We follow Bessembinder and Kaufman 
(1997) in decomposing spreads in this manner. 
C. Event window 
Our time window for analysis is the 30 trading days before and after the 
implementation of Reg. NMS, which began on July 9, 2007. While 30 days is a relatively 
short time in which to see large changes in market outcomes, the time window is 
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intentionally small in order to isolate the effects of regulatory change from other changes 
in the market. Again, to select the size of our event window, we follow existing studies 
including Easley et al. (1996), Battalio et al. (1998), Foucault and Menkveld (2008), and 
Chung and Chuwonganat (2012) who also study Reg. NMS and find a decline in other 
indicators of market quality after its implementation. The SEC also applied a 60-day 
event window to its pilot study for Reg. NMS.10 
Figures 2 and 3 plot descriptive statistics for our sample over the event window.  
Figure 2 shows no appreciable shift in average trading volume for our sample stocks over 
the event window—certainly nothing as great as the eventual shift in trading volume seen 
in Figure 1. Figure 3 shows our metric of interest, the average spread differentials for 
NYSE and Nasdaq transactions for our sample (i.e., Nasdaq spread – NYSE spread). A 
slightly higher level after Reg. NMS may be discernable, as is a positive differential even 
before Reg. NMS. 
V. Results 
Table 1 presents results from variations of the model in equation (1), where 
spread is measured in cents (i.e., calculated spread is multiplied by 100). Model 1 is the 
basic specification in equation (1). We find that the interaction term is positive and 
significant, indicating that Nasdaq spreads for NYSE-listed shares increase relative to 
NYSE spreads after Reg. NMS. 
																																																								
10 The SEC ordered a pilot test of Reg. NMS and asked the NYSE to select 100 listings for a 30-day test, 
which began July 9, 2007. Appendix A lists the 99 pilots, the majority of which have large market 
capitalizations and are heavily traded. We constructed our sample by selecting all large-cap, heavily traded 
stocks in the same industries as the pilots. Because there were no technological barriers to implementing 
the new Order Protection Rule on July 9 for all listings, we tested whether trades for pilot stocks were 
routed differently than other NYSE stocks and found that they were not. We therefore take July 9 to be the 
start date for Reg. NMS generally for all NYSE listings. 
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We also find that Nasdaq spreads are higher overall than NYSE spreads. One 
explanation for this is that Nasdaq trades met the posted NYSE quote, while NYSE 
transactions occurred inside the quote, i.e., at a better price. This would be consistent 
with Petersen and Fialkowski’s (1994) findings that actual spreads are half the size of 
posted spreads for trades on the NYSE. 
Model 1 also shows a secular increase in spreads after Reg. NMS. Models 2 and 3 
present our robustness check, by adding a control for a time trend. The results show a 
positive and significant effect of time. However, Model 3, which interacts the time trend 
with after NMS, shows that the time trend begins after Reg. NMS, with no trend before 
Reg. NMS. This suggests that the effects of regulation might occur gradually. 
The average spread in our sample is 0.53 cents for NYSE trades and 0.57 cents 
for Nasdaq trades. The coefficients, also reported in cents, suggest that spreads increase 
by 0.033 cents, or 6%, for Nasdaq trades relative to NYSE trades in the first month of the 
new regulation. This is in addition to higher spreads for Nasdaq trades generally of about 
0.024 cents, or 4.5%. Thus, the first month of Reg. NMS saw a difference in spreads 
between NYSE and Nasdaq trades of 10%. The longer-term descriptive data in Figure 4 
suggest that spreads increase substantially more over time. 
Note that our results allow us to reject alternate hypotheses. The competitive 
outcome of lower spreads does not obtain, nor does the no-change outcome. Thus, 
heterogeneous incentives appear to affect market outcomes. 
VI. Discussion & Conclusion 
Nonprofits are not always strange animals. In fact, sometimes they do exactly 
what a for-profit would do, as was the case with the nonprofit and for-profit versions of 
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the Nasdaq. But nonprofits can behave differently than for-profits for predictable reasons 
and in predictable ways. 
In this study, we provide an example of a nonprofit member organization 
vertically integrating into stock trading to enhance underwriting profits. While 
underwriting activity gets less attention than trading, it is a lucrative business in which a 
single initial public offering (IPO) can easily generate tens of millions - and even 
hundreds of millions - of dollars in fees for the lead underwriters (Ho and Demos 2014). 
To maximize that business, underwriters, which we posit have long dominated the 
NYSE, insured that trading was orderly, i.e., continuous and relatively smooth, by tightly 
regulating specialists. This helped prevent the development of a “lemons” problem at the 
NYSE (Akerlof 1970), which in turn enabled underwriters to generate higher IPO 
valuations and, therefore, higher underwriting profits. Our institutional analysis 
highlights the incentives behind mechanisms and outcomes that are often taken for 
granted, with recent problems serving as counterfactuals. Events such as the “flash crash” 
of 2010 and the allegations of market “rigging” in favor of so-called “high frequency 
traders” (Lewis 2014), can jeopardize investor participation while botched IPOs, such as 
that of Facebook on the Nasdaq and BATS on its own internal trading system, show how 
difficult and complex is the underwriting process. 
The stock market is an economically important institution, but it is just one of 
many regulated industries. Nonprofits are frequently involved in providing public goods 
and often as monopolies. This study demonstrates the importance of carefully analyzing 
nonprofit incentives, including their potential heterogeneity. 
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Table 1: Changes in bid-ask spread of trades before and during the pilot test 		
 (1) (2) (3) 
Nasdaq (y=1) 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
 
(0.004) 
After 0.163*** 
 
(0.015) 
-0.054** 
 
(0.022) 
-0.550*** 
 
(0.059) 
Nasdaq*after 0.033*** 
 
(0.007) 
0.033*** 
 
(0.007) 
0.033*** 
 
(0.007) 
Trend  0.007*** 
 
(0.001) 
0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Trend*after   0.014*** 
 
(0.001) 
R2 (within) 0.013 0.020 0.026 
R2 (between) 0.053 0.044 0.053 
R2 (overall) 0.013 0.019 0.026 
N 27,166 27,166 27,166 								
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 Figure 1: Trading Volume for all NYSE-listed stocks (Jan 2004 – Dec 2011) 
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Figure 2: Average difference in trading volume for sample (mill shares): NYSE 
transactions – Nasdaq transactions  			
	
                               Day 0 = July 9, 2007 	
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
-3
2
-2
9
-2
6
-2
3
-2
0
-1
7
-1
4
-1
1 -8 -5 -2 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28
day
sh
ar
e
s 
tr
ad
e
d 
(m
il
l)
Reg.	NMS		
 24 
Figure	3	-	Spread	differential	over	event	date							
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Figure 4: Average Bid-Ask Spread ($) for NYSE-listed stocks, Jan 1995 – Dec 2009 			
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Appendix A: 98 NYSE Pilot Stocks 
 
(*foreign-owned; **exchange traded fund; ***out of business) 
 
ABI APPLERA CORP 
ABT ABBOTT LABORATORIES 
ABY ABITIBI CONSOLIDATED 
INC** 
ACI ARCH COAL INC 
AEO AMERICAN EAGLE 
OUTFITTERS INC NE 
AET AETNA INC NEW 
AG AGCO CORP 
AHM AMERICAN HOME 
MORTGAGE INVT CORP *** 
AIG AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP INC 
ANF ABERCROMBIE & FITCH CO 
AT ALLTEL CORP 
BR BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL 
SOLUTNS INC 
BTU PEABODY ENERGY CORP 
C CITIGROUP INC 
CAG CONAGRA INC 
CAH CARDINAL HEALTH INC 
CAL CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC 
CCJ CAMECO CORP ** 
CCU CLEAR CHANNEL 
COMMUNICATIONS INC 
CNP CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC 
CNQ CANADIAN NATURAL 
RESOURCES LTD * 
CPB CAMPBELL SOUP CO 
D DOMINION RESOURCES INC 
VA NEW 
DNA GENENTECH INC 
DOW DOW CHEMICAL CO 
DOX AMDOCS LTD ** 
DRL DORAL FINANCIAL CORP 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 
EEM ISHARES TRUST ** 
EIX EDISON INTERNATIONAL 
EP EL PASO CORP 
EWT ISHARES INC 
FCS FAIRCHILD 
SEMICONDUCTOR INTL INC 
FMT FREMONT GENERAL CORP 
FRX FOREST LABS INC 
GCI GANNETT INC 
GD GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP 
GE GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 
GS GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP 
INC 
GSF GLOBALSANTAFE CORP * 
HC HANOVER COMPRESSOR CO 
HES HESS CORP 
HIG HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS 
GRP INC 
HK PETROHAWK ENERGY CORP 
HON HONEYWELL 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
HRB BLOCK H & R INC 
IBN ICICI BANK LTD * 
IGT INTERNATIONAL GAME 
TECHNOLOGY 
IMH IMPAC MORTGAGE 
HOLDINGS INC ** 
IP INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 
JNJ JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
JPM JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
KG KING PHARMACEUTICALS 
INC 
KSS KOHLS CORP 
LM LEGG MASON INC 
LOW LOWES COMPANIES INC 
LTR LOEWS CORP 
MAS MASCO CORP 
MDT MEDTRONIC INC 
MO ALTRIA GROUP INC 
MRK MERCK & CO INC 
MRO MARATHON OIL CORP 
MS MORGAN STANLEY DEAN 
WITTER & CO 
MTG M G I C INVESTMENT CORP 
WIS 
NEM NEWMONT MINING CORP 
NFX NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 
CO 
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NLY ANNALY CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT INC ** 
NRG N R G ENERGY INC 
NSM NATIONAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 
NWS NEWS CORP 
NYT NEW YORK TIMES CO 
PDP POWERSHARES ETF TRUST** 
PG PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 
PGR PROGRESSIVE CORP OH 
PHM PULTE HOMES INC 
PRU PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL 
INC 
Q QWEST COMMUNICATIONS 
INTL INC 
RDC ROWAN COMPANIES INC 
RDN RADIAN GROUP INC 
RRI RELIANT ENERGY INC 
RYL RYLAND GROUP INC 
SAP SAP AG* 
SKM S K TELECOM CO LTD * 
SKS SAKS INC 
SLR SOLECTRON CORP 
STZ CONSTELLATION BRANDS 
INC 
SVM SERVICEMASTER CO 
T AT &T INC 
TIE TITANIUM METALS CORP 
TIN TEMPLE INLAND INC 
TOL TOLL BROTHERS INC 
TRI TRIAD HOSPITALS INC 
TV GRUPO TELEVISA SA* 
VG VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP 
VIA VIACOM INC NEW 
WCI W C I COMMUNITIES  INC
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